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WHAT WERE JESUS AND THE PHARlSEES TALKING 
ABOUT WHEN THEY TALKED ABOUT LAW? 
David A. Skeel, Jr.' 
Jesus' Legal Theory-A Rabbinic Reading opens with a startling 
claim. The increasing number of legal scholars who have begun 
exploring the relationship between Christianity and American law in the 
past several years have neglected to consider the insights of Jesus 
himself. "[N]otably absent from this literature," Professor Saiman 
writes, "is any extensive examination of Jesus, and his views about 
jurisprudence and legal theory. Despite the overall diversity of his 
writings, there is little discussion about what Jesus thought about law, 
lawyers, legal rules and the legal order."' What, the article asks, does 
Jesus' own legal theory look like? 
Many of Jesus' clearest pronouncements on the nature and proper 
use of the law come in his skirmishes with the Pharisees, the forerunners 
of rabbinic Judaism. It is on these exchanges, and the contrasts between 
Jesus' and the Pharisee's perspectives, that Jesus' Legal Theory focuses. 
As Professor Saiman points out, Jesus regularly resists the careful 
parsing of precedents. When the Pharisees ask why his disciples are 
plucking heads of grain on the Sabbath, for instance, he tells them "the 
Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath."2 Similarly, Jesus 
radically expands the concept of "neighbor" in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. The Pharisees and their rabbinic successors, by contrast, 
place much more emphasis on the literal terms of the law. For them, 
"meticulous observance of the Torah and its commandments ... reflects 
the highest form of divine service."3 These tendencies, Professor 
Saiman argues, continue to distinguish Jewish and Christian 
perspectives today. Rabbinic reasoning "involves the application of text 
and precedent to facts, "4 whereas Christians tend to question whether 
law is "the correct platform through which to analyze and decide 
important religious and social issues. It is thought to be overly 
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res tn c t1 ve, and unjustifiab ly repl aces fa ith and love with rules and 
precedents. "5 After develop ing thi s contrast through a series of careful ly 
argued examples, Professor Saiman concludes by ex plori ng the 
simi lar ities between the Jewish and Christian modes of interpretati on, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, th e debate between formali sm and mo re 
fl ex ible approaches in contemporary law . The Phari sees' lega l 
reasoning emphasi zes the law's lette r and all of its correlates (form as 
opposed to subs tance, rul e of law, orig inalisrn/textua li sm) , he argues, 
whereas Jesus comes down on the side of the law' s spirit (sub stance 
over fonn , j ustice in the particul ar case, liv ing interpreta tion) 
Jesus' Legal Theo ry is a model of law and religion schola rsh ip. 
Although Professor Sa iman writes from the perspective of a rabbini ca lly 
trained lega l schol ar who is a sympathetic outs ider to Christiani ty, his 
aim is descriptive, to explore Jesus' and the Pharisees' divergent 
concep tions of law wi thout taking sides. For readers unfamiliar with the 
rabbinic tradition, he intersperses clari fying details to provide context 
for hi s analysis of the debate. His analyses of the textual reasoning that 
underlies the Pharisees ' vi ews on the Shabbat, the obligations to a 
neighbor and other issues will be especially eye-opening to those who 
know the Pharisees simply as rule-obsessed foils for Jesus' teachings in 
the New Testament. 
As with any sharp dichotomy, one can quibble with this one. To 
give the most obvious historical counterexample to Professor Saiman 's 
contrast between rabbinic attention to legal detail and Christian 
fl ex ibili ty, the Catholic canon law seems (as Professor Saiman notes) to 
reflect the careful accretion of precedents he associates with rabbinic 
reasoning. But the overall point is both subtl_e and compel ling: Jesus 
and the Pharisees engaged in very different modes of legal 
interpretation . Attending to these differences offers a multitude of 
ins ights into the New Tes tament, the Mosaic law and contemporary 
American law. 
The brief discussion that foll ows will raise, and worry the bone of, 
a single question: what were Jesus and the Pharisees ta lking about when 
they talked about law? 
Strictly speaking, as Professor Saiman notes at the outset of the 
article , the law at the heart of Jesus' disputes with the Pharisees was the 
law outlined in the Hebrew Bible: "the Torah or the 'Law of Moses,' 
i.e ., the legal rules an d prac tices observed by first century Jews."6 For 
5. !d. ct I 06. 
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the purposes of the article, however, Professor Saiman defines Jaw more 
broadly. "Law," he writes, "refers to a reasoning process, an ongoing 
conversation whereby professional jurists analyze legal texts, precedents 
and rules to reconcile competing social ideals and values."7 As this 
broad definition suggests, Jesus' Legal Theory assumes that Jesus' 
statements about the Mosaic law apply not just to the Mosaic Jaw, but 
also to contemporary secular law and any other context that involves the 
analysis of legal texts. 
The assumption that Jesus' stance on the Mosaic law translates 
directly into other contexts is, it seems to me, worth examining more 
closely. The recent American culture wars offer an obvious challenge. 
If the dichotomy outlined in Jesus' Legal Theory is accurate, one would 
expect to find Protestant evangelicals calling for flexible, open-ended 
interpretations of the Constitution when the courts address abortion, 
homosexuality and other sharply contested issues. Jesus condenmed 
nitpicky interpretations of the law, the reasoning might go, so surely 
evangelicals would distance themselves from the originalist and 
textualist modes of interpretation that have been much debated in the 
past several decades. Yet this is not what we see at all. Almost to a one, 
the leading evangelical legal organizations decry flexible interpretations 
of the Constitution such as Justice Brennan's "living Constitution" and 
advocate strict adherence to its original terms. What gives? 
If Professor Saiman's dichotomy were exactly backwards, and it 
was Jesus who called for formalistic interpretation, the puzzle would of 
course disappear. But this can't be the explanation. On any plausible 
reading of the Gospel narratives-and I find Professor Saiman's 
readings more than simply plausible-Jesus called for a broader, more 
flexible interpretation of the Mosaic law than his Pharisaic interlocutors, 
just as Professor Saiman suggests. Professor Saiman hints at a second 
explanation: perhaps evangelicals have lost sight of the interpretative 
principles that lie at the heart of their faith. "It is no small irony," 
Professor Saiman writes, "that groups who champion Jesus align 
themselves more closely with the interpretive project of the Talmudic 
rabbis than with Jesus' approach to both the Law of the Torah and law 
more generally. Similarly," he continues, shifting the shoe to the other 
foot, "those most likely to deny that Jesus has anything to teach us about 
American law may inadvertently be bearing witness to Jesus' conception 
oflaw."8 
7. !d. 
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I agree that the evangelical obsession with strict construction is 
incongruous in some respects. But I think we also need to consider 
whether a flexible interpretation of the Mosaic law necessarily implies a 
flexible interpretation of American Constitutional law. If there are good 
reasons to interpret Divine law and human law differently, the irony may 
not be quite so stark as it at first appears. To be sure, the distinctions 
between divine and human law are often blurred in the New Testament. 
When Jesus responds to a lawyer's question about who is his neighbor 
by telling the parable of the Good Samaritan, his answer could be 
construed as defining a legal obligation meant to be enforced by human 
authorities (what we would now call a Good Samaritan obligation), a 
moral obligation (overseen by God rather than men and women), or 
both. I take him to be emphasizing the moral obligation. In other 
passages, such as Jesus' Sermon on the Mount teachings that a person 
who lusts has committed adultery and a man who is angry at his brother 
is a murderer, the emphasis on God's law seems even more clear. 
Because human regulators and law enforcers, unlike God, cannot look 
into our hearts to discern our anger or lust, ordinary men and women 
could never systematically enforce these principles.9 
If these observations are more or less on the mark, they suggest 
that one could plausibly embrace both Jesus' call to interpret the law of 
God expansively and flexibly, on the one hand, and a narrow approach 
to Constitutional and statutory interpretation, on the other. 1° From this 
perspective, evangelicals' enthusiasm for strict construction is not as 
paradoxical as it seems at first. To fully develop the argument, one 
might also want to incorporate a theory or theories of judicial review. 
One obvious candidate is the familiar concern that judges are less 
accountable to the populace than legislators, and should therefore be 
encouraged to curb any enthusiasm for expansive interpretation. 
Having outlined a possible justification for evangelicals' insistence 
on originalism and textualism, I should also note that the stridency of 
this insistence seems to me to reflect other factors as well. I suspect, for 
instance, the resonance within the evangelical community of complaints 
about the refusal of "unelected judges" to be bound by the statutory text 
also owes something to the tradition of Biblical literalism in American 
9. For much more detailed analysis of the relationship between God's law and the secular 
law, and of the proper scope of secular law, see David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, 
Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. Penn. J. Cons!. L. 809 (2006); William J. Stuntz, 
Christian Legal Theory, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (2003). 
I 0. Professor Saiman does in fact briefly allude to this possibility (p . 99), but in my view it is 
dismissed too quickly. 
141] JESUS AND THE PHARISEES 145 
evangelicalism. Were we to plumb these connections, and to put them 
in the context of Jesus' teachings, I do think we might indeed discover 
some irony in the evangelical stance. 
A closely related issue of scope, in addition to the relationship 
between God's law and human law, is the distinction between legislation 
and its enforcement by courts or other decision makers. Although 
Professor Saiman 's definition of law is capacious enough to encompass 
both, he seems most concerned with the ex post interpretative role 
played by courts or other decision makers. Jesus' skirmishes with the 
Pharisees over issues such as the role of the Sabbath have this quality, as 
does the analogy to Constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
What, if anything, do Jesus' and the Pharisees' debates tell us 
about legislation? In my view, Jesus' expansive interpretation of the law 
of Moses actually may, for the reasons already discussed, imply a 
narrow view of the appropriate scope of legislation that imposes secular 
criminal or civil liability. As noted above, the laws Jesus describes in 
the Sermon on the Mount are far too expansive to be enforced by human 
law enforcers. Because law enforcers cannot look into a person's heart, 
and because they are sinful just as ordinary citizens are, a liability 
system that attempted to police every sin would be wholly 
unmanageable and would invite discriminatory enforcement. Unlike 
God's law, human law must play the double game of restraining the 
worst sins of the citizenry without giving law enforcers so much 
discretion that they are invited to sin themselves. 11 
I would be curious to know how these questions of scope would 
play out under a rabbinic approach to law-making. I suspect that the 
reasoning process would differ from that of a Christian legal scholar in 
much the same way as it does in the judicial context. 
Take, for instance, a prosaic question like the proper scope of 
corporate regulation. Christian legal scholars have tended to address 
this question by identifying a handful of general Scriptural principles 
and applying these principles to the modem corporation. Thus, Catholic 
legal scholars have debated whether the general principles known as 
Catholic Social Thought are best honored by vesting extensive 
discretion in the managers of large corporations, or by governmental 
intervention to promote the interests of otherwise disadvantaged 
II. For elaboration, see Skeel & Stuntz, supra n. 9. This suggests another irony in 
contemporary American evangelicalism-the tendency to assume that legislation can and should 
be used to solve most social problems, despite Jesus' suggestion, as Professor Saiman puts it, that 
"law is an ill-suited medium through which to structure social relationships." (p. 100). 
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groups. 12 Protestant legal scholars too seem to reason from general 
principles. 13 If the dichotomy outlined in Jesus' Legal Theory extends to 
the legislative context, one would expect a rabbinic scholar to construct 
·hi s or her theory from the ground up, starting with the closest Biblical 
precedent for corporate behavior. As a dazzling young rabbinically 
trained legal scho lar suggested to me over coffee some months ago, a 
rabbinic approach might look first at relevant Biblical precedents such as 
the public ownership of the sacrifice or the treatment of offerings made 
by the people of Israel. It would be fascinating and instructive to see 
where this analysis leads--or has Jed, to the extent that rabbinically 
trained scholars have wrestled with these issues in the past. 
As these comments reflect, Jesus' Legal Theory has the same 
qualities as the very finest performances in other contexts: not only will 
it cause both Christian and Jewish readers to think more carefully about 
their own religious traditions; not only will it give them new insights 
into a different tradition, and give other readers rich new insights into 
both traditions and their influence on American law; but the article 
leaves this reader, as I suspect it will many others, anxious for more. 
12. For a survey of this literature and the debate it has spawned, see Mark A. Sargent, 
Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought, 1 J. Cath. Soc. Thought 561 
(2004). 
13. See e.g. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 Cath. U.L. 
Rev. 1 (2006) (relevance of religious conceptions of faithfulness to corporate governance). 
